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ABSTRACT
Previous studies of the U.S. Great Depression ﬁnd that increased government spending and taxa-
tion contributed little to either the dramatic downturn or the slow recovery. These studies include
only one type of capital taxation: a business proﬁts tax. The contribution is much greater when
the analysis includes other types of capital taxes. A general equilibrium model extended to include
taxes on dividends, property, capital stock, excess proﬁts, and undistributed proﬁts predicts pat-
terns of output, investment, and hours worked that are more like those in the 1930s than found
in earlier studies. The greatest eﬀects come from the increased taxes on corporate dividends and
undistributed proﬁts.
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1I. Introduction
Although there is no general agreement on the primary causes of the U.S. Great Depression—
deﬁned as both the sharp economic contraction in the early 1930s and the subsequent slow
recovery—many do agree that ﬁscal policy played only a minor role. This conventional view
is based on both empirical and theoretical analyses of the period. Although federal government
spending notably increased during the 1930s, the data show that as a share of GDP, it did not in-
crease enough to have had a large impact on economic activity overall (Brown, 1956). At the same
time, income tax rates increased sharply, but taxes were ﬁled by few households and paid by even
fewer (Seltzer, 1968).1 Feeding estimates of spending and tax rates into a standard neoclassical
growth model, Cole and Ohanian (1999) conﬁrm that the impact of ﬁscal policy during the 1930s
was too small to matter. Here, I challenge that conventional view by extending the basic growth
model in ways suggested by actual U.S. ﬁscal policies in the 1930s. My extended model improves
on the basic model’s predictions of U.S. economic activity during that decade and strongly suggests
that ﬁscal policy did, in fact, play a major role in the Great Depression.
My primary extension is to include capital taxes that are not typically included in the basic
growth model analyzed by Cole and Ohanian (1999) and many others. Standard practice is to
model capital taxes as taxes on business proﬁts.2 I look as well at taxes on capital stock, prop-
erty, excess proﬁts, undistributed proﬁts, and dividends. When these overlooked capital taxes are
incorporated into the neoclassical framework, along with taxes on normal business proﬁts, labor,
and consumption, the model predicts patterns in aggregate economic activity that are much closer
to those in U.S. data, especially U.S. investment, than previous studies have found.
Diﬀerentiating capital taxes paid by businesses and those paid by individuals plays a key role
for my results. A major ﬁscal policy change in the 1930s is the sharp increase in tax rates on indi-
vidual incomes, which include corporate dividends. Although few households paid income taxes,
those who did earned almost all of the income distributed by corporations and unincorporated
businesses. If the increases in rates were not completely unexpected, these households would have
foreseen large declines in future gross returns on investments. An optimal response by compa-
nies would have been to distribute earnings in advance of the tax increases rather than to reinvest
them. Thus, increasing the tax rate on dividends has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on investment, even before
1932 when major changes were enacted. If, in addition to raising individual income tax rates, the
1 The percentage of the total population covered by taxable returns was 4.1 percent in 1929 and only 2.6 percent
by 1933.
2 See, for example, the business cycle studies of Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994) and the Great Depression
studies in Kehoe and Prescott (2007).
2government introduces a tax on the undistributed proﬁts of corporations, as the U.S. government
did in 1936, then investment is again negatively impacted. The introduction of such a tax would
naturally aﬀect the recovery in the second half of the 1930s.
With a tax system that includes key features of U.S. policy and uncertainty about future
tax rates, the extended model predicts U.S. economic activity signiﬁcantly better than the basic
model. That model predicts strongly counterfactual changes between 1929 and 1932: for example,
a 1 percent rise in GDP instead of a 31 percent fall and a 2 percent rise in per capita hours
worked instead of a 27 percent fall. The extended model predicts declines in both of these series,
predictions that account for about 36 percent of the actual decline in GDP and 38 percent of the
actual decline in hours of work. Perhaps more dramatically, the extended model improves on the
predicted path of investment. Over the decade, U.S. investment ﬁrst dropped sharply, between
1929 and 1932, then recovered a bit before again dropping sharply in 1938. The basic model badly
misses that pattern; the extended model captures it. The extended model also does a better job
in predicting the drop in equity values, which fell by roughly 30 percent by the end of the decade.3
A closer look at the quantitative results reveals an important diﬀerence between taxing proﬁts
and taxing dividends. An increase in the tax rate on proﬁts lowers the net return to capital. To
have a large impact on the gross return to capital, the tax rate on proﬁts would have had to rise
signiﬁcantly more than it did during the 1930s. On the other hand, assuming households expect a
change in policy, an increase in the tax rate on dividends lowers the gross return to capital. Thus,
changes in tax rates on dividends that are comparable in magnitude to changes in tax rates on
proﬁts have a much larger impact on the model’s predictions, especially for investment. Variations
in household expectations do aﬀect the timing of the declines in investment, but I ﬁnd that all
settings within an empirically plausible range yield large declines in investment, like those observed
in U.S. data.
Factors other than tax policy clearly were involved in the deep downturn and slow recovery of
the 1930s. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that the initial consumption predictions
do not line up well with the data. U.S. consumption fell sharply in the early part of the 1930s,
yet both the basic model and the extended model miss that drop. In fact, the extended model
actually predicts an initial rise. Expectations of higher future capital tax rates imply a sharp initial
increase in distributions of business incomes, accomplished by decreasing investment. Increased
distributions then lead, counterfactually, to increased consumption, which falls only when higher
3 In McGrattan (2012), I include intangible investments in the model because they can be expensed and thus
lower taxable business proﬁts. The main quantitative results are similar.
3sales and excise taxes are imposed. Adding New Deal policies (as in the 2004 work of Cole and
Ohanian) would help further account for the time series patterns in the later part of the decade.
But we need other ways to account for the pattern of consumption in the early part.
In related work, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Ohanian (2009) use versions of the neo-
classical growth model motivated by the U.S. experience in the Great Depression, especially the
large contraction early in the decade. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) introduce an asymmetry of
information between borrowers and lenders that exacerbates negative shocks to the net worth of
investors. Their theory formalizes the view that periods of ﬁnancial crisis are typiﬁed by low and
ineﬃcient investment. Ohanian (2009) introduces cartelization in the manufacturing sector and
assumes that ﬁrms keep real wages high and weekly hours low. His theory formalizes the view that
Herbert Hoover’s industrial labor program started the Great Depression. Neither Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) nor Ohanian (2009) includes a role for capital taxes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I describe extensions to the basic neoclassical
growth model that are central to the analysis. In Section III, I describe the source and construction
of the main model inputs: tax rates, spending, and policy expectations. In Section IV, I compare
the extended model’s predictions to U.S. data and to predictions of the basic model, quantifying
the role of ﬁscal policies and expectations. In Section V, I investigate the role of expectations
and two key capital taxes. In Section VI, I provide some cross-country evidence in support of my
ﬁndings. Section VII concludes.
II. Theory
To analyze U.S. ﬁscal policy in the 1930s, I use an extension of the basic neoclassical growth
model that includes a more comprehensive speciﬁcation of taxes than is typically used. Speciﬁcally,
I include taxes on property, capital stock, excess proﬁts, undistributed proﬁts, dividends, and sales
in addition to taxes on wages and normal business proﬁts analyzed by Cole and Ohanian (1999).
Consider ﬁrst the problem solved by households. Given the initial capital stock k0, the stand-





βt{log(ct) + ψ log(1 − ht)}Nt
subject to the constraints
ct + xt = rtkt + wtht + κt − ζt, (1)
4kt+1 = [(1 − δ)kt + xt]/(1 + η), (2)
and nonnegativity constraints on investments xt ≥ 0, where variables are written in per capita
terms, Nt = N0(1+η)t is the population in t, which grows at rate η, β is the time discount factor,
ψ is a parameter governing the disutility of work, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Capital
is paid rent rt; labor is paid wage wt. Per capita transfers are given by κt and taxes by ζt.
The ﬁrms’ aggregate production technology is given by
(3) Yt = Kθ
t (ZtHt)
1−θ ,
where capital letters denote aggregates and θ is the capital share of output. The parameter Zt
is labor-augmenting technical change that is assumed to grow at a constant rate, Zt = (1 + γ)t.
The ﬁrm rents capital and labor. If proﬁts are maximized, then the rental rates are equal to the
marginal products. The goods market clears, so Nt(ct + xt + gt) = Yt, where gt is per capita
government spending.
Two versions of the model are considered and diﬀer in the speciﬁcations of taxes and transfers.
In the basic model, taxes are the sum of taxes on labor income and proﬁts to capital,
(4) ζt = τhtwtht + τpt (rt − δ)kt,
where τht is the tax rate on labor income and τpt is the tax rate on proﬁts. Transfers are determined
residually as revenues less spending, κt = ζt − gt, and paid as a lump sum to households. The
transfers are taken as given by households when solving their maximization problem.
In the extended model, I include additional taxes in the formula for ζt and, because my focus
is taxation of business capital, I distinguish between business and nonbusiness activity. Let xbt
and xnt = xt − xbt denote business and nonbusiness investment, respectively. Similarly, let kbt
and knt = kt − kbt denote business and nonbusiness capital stocks. The formula for taxes in the
extended model is given by
ζt = τhtwtht + τpt (rt − δ − τkt)kbt (5)
+ τctct + τktkbt + τut ((1 + η)kb,t+1 − kbt)
+ τdt{rtkbt − xbt − τpt (rt − δ − τkt)kbt − τktkbt − τut ((1 + η)kb,t+1 − kbt)},
where τpt is now the tax rate on business proﬁts, τct is the tax rate on consumption, τkt is the tax
rate on business property, τut is the tax rate on undistributed proﬁts, and τdt is the tax rate on
5dividends. Note that taxable income for the tax on proﬁts is net of depreciation and property tax,
and taxable income for the tax on dividends is net of taxes on proﬁts, property, and undistributed
proﬁts.
The formula in equation (5) includes capital taxes on business activities, which are assumed to
be those of corporations and nonfarm proprietors. Tax revenues from the nonbusiness sector, which
accounts for about 36 percent of U.S. value added, are included with transfers. This is convenient
because I assume that choices of nonbusiness output, investment, and hours are set exogenously
to be consistent with U.S. time series. I do this to ensure that my model accounts line up with
the U.S. national accounts. Speciﬁcally, nonbusiness output, which I denote ynt, less nonbusiness
investment xnt and any taxes on nonbusiness incomes is (exogenously) included with transfers to
households κt. With nonbusiness net income included with transfers, equations (1)–(3) can be
rewritten with business components of capital, labor, and investment replacing the aggregates.4
GDP in both the basic and extended versions of the model is the sum of private consumption
c, public consumption g, and investment x; in per capita terms, GDP is thus c+g +x. The value
of business capital is given by
(6) Vt = (1 − τdt)(1 + τut)Kbt+1,
where Kbt+1 is the aggregate end-of-year business capital stock. Notice that the value is directly
aﬀected by capital taxes through prices of capital and indirectly aﬀected by capital taxes through
their eﬀects on the time variation of capital.
The formulation for ζt in equation (5) assumes that businesses ﬁnance investment with internal
funds rather than with external funds. This choice is motivated by data on sources of funds of
nonﬁnancial corporations from Goldsmith (1958, Table 53). Goldsmith’s series shows that 98
percent of investment funds of nonﬁnancial corporations were supplied by internal sources over
the period 1934–1939 when business investment was rising. An important factor determining the
ﬁnancing decision is the cost of security ﬂotation. Surveys done by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (1941, Table 1) show high costs of ﬂotation for issues of common stock. For example,
in 1938, a sample of 81 ﬁrms issuing stock through investment bank facilities had average costs of
20.1 percent of the amount issued. Costs for bond issues were lower, but Goldsmith’s data show
that borrowing was not an important source of funds during the 1930s. In a study of ﬁrm-level
data in 1936, Calomiris and Hubbard (1995) ﬁnd that only one in four ﬁrms issued bonds, with 10
4 See the time paths of U.S. nonbusiness activity in the Appendix, Table A.1. These series are treated as inputs
for the extended model simulations.
6percent of ﬁrms in their sample accounting for 90 percent of bond issues. Haven (1940) attributes
the low rate of issuance to restrictions in the Banking Act of 1935 that prohibited the sale of
low-grade bonds to bank customers.
Another implicit assumption that is made in formulating taxes in the extended model as I do is
that households receive distributions in the form of dividend payments rather than as capital gains.
Given the tax advantage of capital gains for higher income households, there is reason to believe
that such households would choose to hold stocks in corporations with low dividend payout ratios.
However, using detailed tax data for 1936 from dividend-paying corporations and the net income
class of dividend recipients ﬁling tax returns, Holland (1962, Table 13) estimates distribution ratios
for each net income class of households and ﬁnds no evidence for an inverted relation between net
income and the distribution ratio. In fact, his estimates show that the distribution ratio is nearly
constant across net income classes. Tax data also support Holland’s ﬁnding: a large fraction of the
income reported by higher income households was in the form of dividends.
III. U.S. Fiscal Policy in the 1930s
To analyze the impact of ﬁscal policies on economic activity, I need to construct time series
for tax rates and government spending. I also need to specify household expectations about future
policy. In this section, I describe in detail how I construct these model inputs and relate them to
U.S. policy during the 1930s.
There are three main sources of tax data—at both the federal and state level—that are used
to construct estimates of tax rates: individual income taxes, corporate income taxes, and indirect
business taxes. At the beginning of the 1930s, the source of most government revenue was indirect
business taxes on property and sales and excise taxes. Over the decade, as deﬁcits grew at all
levels of government, legislators increased tax rates, especially rates of individual and corporate
income taxes and sales and excise taxes. They also introduced taxes on capital stock and excess
proﬁts in 1933 and on undistributed business proﬁts in 1936. In this section, I describe the sources
and construction of the relevant tax rates, which are summarized in Table I.
III.A. Individual Income Taxes
The ﬁrst two series in Table I are average marginal tax rates constructed from tax returns on
individual income and are the empirical analogues of the model rates τh and τd. The source of the
ﬁrst, the tax rate on labor income, is Barro and Redlick (2011), who sum the average marginal
7tax rates constructed from federal income tax data published in the U.S. Treasury Department’s
Statistics of Income (SOI), the Social Security payroll tax rates, and average marginal tax rates
from state income tax data. The average marginal tax rates are weighted sums of marginal tax rates
for each income class, with weights equal to the fraction of income that the income class receives.
Speciﬁcally, if income class i pays τi on an additional dollar of income earned and earns yi/
P
i yi





The source of Barro and Redlick’s (2011) federal income tax rate is Barro and Sahasakul
(1983), who calculate marginal tax rates for each class of net income, the measure of income
used by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the 1930s. Net income is taxable income less
exemptions. In order to compute a long time series, Barro and Sahasakul weight the marginal
rates by total incomes, which is a proxy for the measure of income used by the IRS in later years,
namely, adjusted gross income. Total adjusted gross income, for ﬁlers and nonﬁlers (paying a
tax rate of zero), is estimated to be 79 percent of national income and product account (NIPA)
personal income during the 1930s. Estimates of the average marginal tax rate from the Social
Security payroll tax rate, which is zero before 1937, are added by Barro and Sahasakul (1986).
To these rates, Barro and Redlick (2011) add average marginal income tax rates from state
income tax data. They do this with the help of two tax calculators: TAXSIM (Feenberg and
Coutts, 1993) and IncTaxCalc (Bakija, 2009). Starting with 1979, the ﬁrst year in which state
identiﬁers are included in the TAXSIM database, Barro and Redlick take a sample of returns and,
for each year from 1929 through 1978, scale the components of income so that the change in per
capita incomes on the returns matches the change in per capita personal income in NIPA. They
then use IncTaxCalc, which has detailed information about tax rates by state, to compute marginal
tax rates as the change in tax liabilities from an incremental change in income.
To construct average marginal tax rates on dividend income from federal tax data, I use the
same methodology as Barro and Sahasakul (1983). Speciﬁcally, I use dividend income for each net
income class as weights and dividend income from NIPA to determine the income of nonﬁlers.5 For
the marginal tax rates, I use only surtaxes prior to 1936 because dividend income was not subject
to the normal rate in this period. One additional adjustment is needed because some dividend
income accrues to ﬁduciaries, but the SOI does not categorize it the same way each year in my
sample. Dividend income of ﬁduciaries is included with all other dividend income between 1929
5 NIPA table 7.16 shows the relation of IRS dividends paid by corporations and NIPA dividends in personal
income. The main diﬀerences are intercorporate dividends plus net dividend income paid to foreigners. Holland
(1962) and U.S. Treasury (1948) estimate that underreported amounts on tax returns are small.
8and 1935 and later with ﬁduciary income. Thus, for 1936 to 1939, I increase the SOI’s reported
dividend income by an amount equal to the SOI’s ﬁduciary income multiplied by an estimate of
the fraction of income ﬁduciaries earn from dividends. My estimate of this fraction is the ratio
of dividend income reported on IRS Form 1041 (ﬁled by all ﬁduciaries) to the balance income on
Form 1041, which is the total income ﬁduciaries have available for distribution.
To construct the tax rates on dividends, τd, I add estimates of average marginal tax rates
for state income taxes, but use a diﬀerent algorithm than do Barro and Redlick (2011), in part
because of the many policy changes that potentially impact the concentration and deferral of
dividend income between 1929 and 1979, when state identiﬁers are ﬁrst available in TAXSIM. For
the years 1929–1939, I use state tax rate schedules from the Tax Research Foundation (1930–1942),
data on the distribution of dividend income across net income classes on federal returns from the
SOI, and data on the fraction of dividends reported on federal returns by state from the SOI. In
essence, for each year and each state, I compute an average marginal tax rate for dividend income
using the tax schedule for that year and state and the distribution of dividend incomes for that year
reported on federal tax returns.6 I then construct a weighted average across states with weights
equal to the fraction of dividend income earned by residents of the states.
III.B. Corporate Income Taxes
The tax rate on proﬁts used in the model simulations, τp, is estimated to be the sum of the tax
rate on normal business proﬁts and the eﬀective rate due to the capital stock tax in combination
with the excess proﬁts tax. For the normal business proﬁt tax, I use the statutory corporate income
tax rate. This series is shown in the fourth column of Table I. For the excess proﬁts tax, used in
combination with the capital stock tax, I follow Brown (1949) and treat them in combination like
an eﬀective tax on business proﬁts. This choice is motivated by the actual U.S. tax system in the
1930s. Companies had to declare a value for their capital stock, and a tax was assessed on that
value. To avoid having companies declare a capital value that was too low, the government used
an excess proﬁts tax as a penalty. For example, in 1934, if proﬁts exceeded 12.5 percent of the
declared capital stock value, then companies paid a 5 percent tax on the excess proﬁts. To avoid
this penalty, companies tended to declare a high value for capital, and they paid roughly 2 percent
of proﬁts because of this tax in addition to their normal tax bill. (See Brown, 1949.) For this
6 Data on the distribution of dividend income are available from the California Franchise Tax Commissioner for
1938. Assuming xi, yi are the dividend incomes for net income class i reported for federal taxes and California
taxes, respectively, I ﬁnd that the correlation between x and y is 95 percent.
9reason, the tax rate I use in model simulations is an estimate of the normal tax on proﬁts plus an
additional 2 percent that is indirectly assessed through the capital stock tax.
For the tax on undistributed proﬁts, τu, which was in eﬀect for the years 1936–1938, I use an
eﬀective rate of 5 percent. This rate implies a ratio of revenues for the undistributed proﬁts tax
relative to the GDP taxes in the model that is roughly equal to the ratios reported in the SOI.
For 1936–1937, the revenues are on the order of 18 percent of GDP per year, whereas in 1938 the
revenues are only about 1 percent of GDP.
III.C. Indirect Business Taxes
Also included in the analysis are indirect business taxes on property, τk, and consumption, τc,
which yielded the bulk of government revenues during the entire decade of the 1930s. These tax
rates are shown in the columns of Table I labeled Property and Sales. The source of the data is
taxes on imports and production in NIPA. To construct the rate for the property tax, I divide the
property tax revenues for corporations and nonfarm proprietors by the sum of the capital stocks of
corporations and nonfarm proprietors.7 To construct the rate for the tax on consumption, I divide
the sales and excise tax revenues by the measure of consumption deﬁned in the Appendix.
III.D. Government Spending
In addition to time-varying tax rates, households face time-varying government spending. (See
the Appendix for data sources and deﬁnitions related to the U.S. national accounts.) The input
to the model simulations is real per capita government consumption relative to a trend of (1+γ)t,
where, recall, γ is the growth rate of labor-augmenting technical change.8 The series is shown
in Table A.1 as “public” consumption to distinguish it from private consumption. In 1929, the
measure of detrended public consumption was 5.8 percent of 1929 real per capita GDP. By 1939,
public consumption relative to trend had risen by 50 percent.
III.E. Policy Expectations
Before I can simulate the time series for the model, I need to describe households’ assumptions
about future government spending and taxes. Expectations are likely to be a key factor, especially
when considering the impact of capital taxation. Thus, here I detail my assumptions, at least for
my initial benchmark expectations.
7 Estate tax rates also rose signiﬁcantly during the 1930s, but the revenues are small relative to those on property.
In McGrattan (2012) I construct an alternative estimate for τk using both tax sources and ﬁnd the diﬀerences
to be too small to aﬀect the results.
8 Government investment is included with nonbusiness investment.
10Table II summarizes the benchmark expectations as a transition matrix of a Markov process
governing the evolution of ﬁscal policies. The rows of the table, or transition matrix, show the
current state, and the columns of the table show the future states. The values in the rows and
columns are the years 1929 through 1939. A current state of 1930 means that ﬁscal policy in this
state is the same as it was in the United States in 1930. I assume that spending and tax rates are
functions of the state, denoted by st; for example, the current tax rate on dividends is τdt = τd(st).
Notice that most transitional probabilities in Table II are zero (and so not listed). Transiting from
the 1930 state, the only possible states for the next year are ﬁscal policies equivalent to U.S. policies
observed in 1929, 1930, and 1931. Households are assumed to put equal weight on each of those
possible future states.9
The parameterization in Table II assumes that there is uncertainty in 1930–1931 and again in
1936–1937 because of actual U.S. events. The initial uncertainty about tax and spending policies
early in the decade was not fully resolved until the U.S. Revenue Act of 1932 was enacted. Before
then, households were warned that spending bills in Congress could not be ﬁnanced out of current
revenue streams. Newspapers throughout 1930 and 1931 included headlines like “Hoover Warns
Congress to Economize or be Faced by Tax Rise of 40 Per Cent” (New York Times, February 25,
1930). But households were not sure if the government would raise taxes during a depression, as
the following newspaper excerpt indicates.
Some, who were pessimistically inclined, believed it would be necessary to recommend to
the next Congress even higher taxes for 1931 than those carried in the 1928 revenue law,
in order to avert a serious deﬁcit at the end of the ﬁscal year 1931. The more general
belief, however, is that the 1928 rates will be permitted to stand even if a deﬁcit results, as
it is felt that a move to increase taxes would further accentuate the economic depression
which is given much concern. It was indicated at the Treasury that Secretary Mellon felt
it was too early to talk with deﬁniteness about the tax situation but that he would go
into a full discussion of the subject . . . in his annual report in Congress in December.
(New York Times, August 22, 1930)
Households remained uncertain about the speciﬁcs of the ﬁnal bill until it was enacted and signed
in 1932. Then they knew that individuals faced large increases in marginal income tax rates.
For several years thereafter, new revenue acts were introduced. In 1933, it was a tax on capital
stock and excess proﬁts (part of the National Industrial Recovery Act). In 1934, the main policy
changes were designed to prevent tax avoidance. In 1935, increases in surtaxes on individuals
9 Treating each input as an independent random variable that can take on a continuum of values involves working
with an enormous state space. Here, I can take advantage of the fact that the exogenous inputs are highly
correlated.
11were made. The main change in 1936 was the introduction of the undistributed proﬁts tax. This
change was likely to have surprised most Americans, since the tax was not proposed until a speech
by President Roosevelt in March 1936. Congress went along with the proposal, and the law was
passed soon thereafter and made applicable to income during the entire calendar year. In modeling
expectations, I have chosen parameters in the transition matrix of Table II consistent with the 1936
law being a completely unanticipated change. Notice that starting from a policy like that of 1935,
households expect a policy like that of 1939; the income tax rate schedule of 1939 is the same as
1936, but undistributed proﬁts taxes were not taxed. During and after 1936, there is uncertainty
about the permanence of the undistributed proﬁts tax, which is modeled as nonzero probabilities
of staying with the same policy (1936) or transiting to the next year (1937). This is done for 1937
as well, since there was uncertainty about whether the policy would continue. The probability
weights of 2/3, 1/3 generate a time pattern of revenues like that observed. In 1938, it was clear
that the undistributed proﬁts tax would be eliminated.
IV. Quantitative Predictions for the U.S. Economy
I now feed the U.S. ﬁscal policies along with estimates of policy expectations into the extended
model and compute equilibrium paths that can be compared with U.S. time series during the 1930s.
I also compare the extended model’s predictions with those of the basic model and show that there
is a marked improvement and demonstrate that conclusions about the importance of ﬁscal policy
are reversed. As a ﬁrst step, I choose parameters for the basic and extended models.
IV.A. Model Parameters
For the basic model, I choose parameters to be consistent with Cole and Ohanian (1999). I
assume that the capital share θ is 0.33, the growth rate of the population η is 1 percent, and the
growth rate of technology γ is 1.9 percent. Values of ψ, δ, and β are then set to ensure that 1929
levels of per capita hours, per capita real investment, and the per capita real capital stock in the
model are consistent with U.S. aggregates shown in Table A.1, with taxes and spending set at 1929
levels. This implies that ψ = 2.33, δ = 0.05, and β = 0.976.10
For the extended model, I follow the same procedure for setting parameters so that the model
economy is consistent with 1929 U.S. levels shown in Table A.1. In this case, I include business
10 Cole and Ohanian (1999) compare steady states with government spending and tax rates set at 1929 and 1939
levels. The tax rates they use are estimated by Joines (1981). I instead compute the transition over the entire
decade and use the tax rates of Barro and Redlick (2011) for τht and the statutory rates on proﬁts for τpt. In
McGrattan (2012), I show that the basic model results are not sensitive to the tax rate choices.
12and nonbusiness activities and all taxes in Table I. Assuming the same growth rates as in the
basic model, namely η = .01 and γ = .019, this implies that θ = .336, ψ = 1.94, δ = 0.036, and
β = 0.955.
For both versions of the model, I compute equilibrium paths starting with initial capital stocks
consistent with 1929 observations (and, thus, the initial aggregate capital stock is k0 = 3.32 in the
basic model and the initial business capital stock is kb0 = 1.72 in the extended model with GDP
normalized to equal 1).
The transition matrix underlying expectations is given in Table II, and the realized states
for the equilibrium paths that I compute are s0 = 1929, s1 = 1930, and so on, until s11 = 1939.
Thus, the sequence of ﬁscal policies that model households face is the same as the sequence that
U.S. households faced. Because the actual policies are the basis of household expectations, I ﬁlter
the actual series used as inputs—namely, the tax rates in Table I, the public consumption in Table
A.1, and the nonbusiness activities in Table A.1—and use only the low frequencies. (See the
Appendix for more details and McGrattan 2012 for plots of the raw data and the smoothed series
used for the model inputs.)
IV.B. Model Predictions
In Figures I–IV, I plot the equilibrium paths for real investment, real consumption, real GDP,
and hours worked in the basic and extended growth models along with their counterparts from
actual U.S. time series. All series are in per capita terms and, with the exception of hours,
detrended by the growth in labor-augmenting technical change (that is, (1 + γ)t). The U.S. data
are detrended in the same way. The series are then indexed so that 1929 equals 100. (See the
Appendix for more details on data construction and sources.)
Figure I establishes my main result, namely, that abstracting from key features of U.S. ﬁscal
policy makes a big diﬀerence in the model’s prediction of real investment as measured in NIPA.11
In the basic version of the model, with only taxes on proﬁts and wages included, real investment
rises 2 percent relative to trend between 1929 and 1932 and eventually falls by 2 percent. On the
other hand, the extended model predicts an immediate and sharp fall in investment, much like
that in the U.S. economy. In both the extended model and the data, declines occur in the period
1929–1932 and then again in 1938.
The fact that investment falls and tax rates rise also has implications for equity values. The
11 The conclusion does not change if, in the basic model, I use Joines’ (1981) tax rates—as Cole and Ohanian
(1999) do—or add a nonbusiness sector. See McGrattan (2012).
13predicted value is shown in equation (6). With a rise in tax rates, prices and quantities fall, but
the model predicts more gradual changes than those of actual stock market values. For example,
the real market value of all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange fell 57 percent below
trend between 1929 and 1932 and by 1939 was below trend by 32 percent. (See U.S. Commerce,
1932–1950.) The model does predict a signiﬁcant decline between 1929 and 1939, reaching a low
of 30 percent below trend, but the drop is gradual because the changes in tax rates and capital
stocks are gradual. By 1932, predicted stock values are only 12 percent below trend.
Figure II shows the consumption paths for the basic and extended models in comparison with
U.S. data. Neither model does well in predicting real consumption, but the extended model does
a bit better. In the data, real consumption drops sharply relative to trend and stays close to its
1933 low through the rest of the decade. In the basic model, consumption barely changes from
its 1929 level. In the extended model, the consumption path counterfactually rises before 1932.
The optimal response to high future capital taxes is high current distributions of business capital,
which are used for consumption.12 According to Fabricant (1935), U.S. dividend payments held
steady at the start of the Depression, even for many companies suﬀering losses, but the model
predicts an increase. Taxes on consumption do rise during the 1930s, implying a negative impact
on consumption, but not signiﬁcantly until after 1932. At that point, consumption in the extended
model does decline sharply.
Predictions for real GDP are shown in Figure III. Not surprisingly, given the predictions for
investment and consumption, neither of the models accounts for the full fall in observed GDP. But
the extended model shows a large improvement over the basic model prediction, which has the
wrong sign. The basic model predicts a 1 percent rise in detrended real GDP between 1929 and
1932, rather than a 31 percent fall. This prediction is the basis of conventional wisdom that ﬁscal
policy can be safely ignored. The extended model, however, predicts an initial decline in real GDP
that is about 36 percent of the actual decline. The decline in model GDP is not greater because
households consume more in the early part of the decade when businesses increase distributions.
Figure IV shows hours worked per capita for the basic and extended models along with the
U.S. data. As in the case of GDP, the prediction of the basic model has the wrong sign. The basic
model predicts a 2 percent rise in per capita hours of work between 1929 and 1932, rather than a
27 percent fall. Households work more because labor income tax rates actually fall in the ﬁrst part
12 The large deviation between consumption patterns in theory and data cannot be resolved by introducing the
type of ﬁnancial frictions proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Taxes on dividends and undistributed
proﬁts have the same impact on economic activity as the agency costs in their model. Both impact the price
of capital, leading to declines in investment and increases in consumption.
14of the Depression, and taxes on business proﬁts have little impact on labor inputs in this period.
The extended model, however, predicts an initial decline in hours of work that is about 38 percent
of the actual decline. This decline occurs even though the tax rate on labor income falls initially
because other taxes that impact hours of work are included in the analysis.
Overall, the results show that the extended model’s predictions for the impact of U.S. ﬁscal
policy are greater than those of the basic model. And the impact is nontrivial, especially for
investment. This overturns the standard result that ﬁscal policy played little or no role in the
U.S. Great Depression.
V. Investigating the Main Results
To better understand the contributions of the various factors included in the extended model,
I simulate variants of the model. The ﬁrst set of simulations, with all but the key factors held
constant over time, provide intuition. The second set of simulations, with perturbations of the
benchmark parameterization, provide a sense of the quantitative impact of the key factors. Overall,
the experiments demonstrate that the primary factors driving the results are taxes on dividends
in the early part of the decade and taxes on undistributed proﬁts in the latter part. The choice of
expectations does aﬀect the pattern of the investment series but, within an empirically plausible
range, does not overturn the main conclusions. Finally, I show that including factors speciﬁcally
intended to generate patterns of GDP and hours consistent with those observed does not worsen
the ﬁt of investment.13
V.A. The Key Factors
In this section, I investigate three key factors for the results and the role each plays in gen-
erating the large decline in investment predicted by the extended model. (See Figure I.) The ﬁrst
two are the tax rates on dividends and undistributed proﬁts.14 The third is expectations about
future tax rates on dividends and undistributed proﬁts.
The primary determinant for the predicted fall in investment in the early 1930s is expectations
about future changes in the tax rate on dividends. The reason for the large decline is that ﬁrms
anticipate large changes in the eﬀective return to capital. To see this, consider the households’
13 See McGrattan (2012) for additional experiments and sensitivity analyses.
14 In McGrattan (2012) I do sensitivity analysis with the other taxes and ﬁnd that the taxes on distributed and
undistributed proﬁts are quantitatively most important.











where expectations are conditioned on the state st, ˆ β = β/(1 + γ), and variables with hats are
per capita series detrended by technology growth; for example, ˆ ct = ct/(1 + γ)t.15 If tax rates on
dividends are constant, then the terms 1−τdt and Et(1−τdt+1) cancel. If, in addition, revenues are
lump sum rebated to households, then taxes on dividends have no eﬀect on equilibrium quantities
other than equity values because neither budget sets nor ﬁrst-order conditions change. However,
if households put a positive probability on dividend tax rates changing, then these taxes do aﬀect
the equilibrium quantities. As soon as there is any weight put on the possibility of a future rise in
income tax rates, ﬁrms increase current distributions to households by lowering investment. Once
tax rates start to rise, they decrease distributions and hence increase their investment, implying a
V-shaped pattern for investment.16
To provide intuition for the qualitative results, I consider a simple example with the tax rate
on dividends starting at a low level, say τL
d , and eventually rising to a higher level, τH
d > τL
d .
For now, assume that all other exogenous processes remain ﬁxed and the only variables are the
dividend tax rate and expectations about the future dividend tax rates. Figure V shows several
paths of investment for diﬀerent choices of expectations and realizations. In all cases, the rate is
τL
d at t=0 and, at that date, is expected to persist. In t=1, expectations change. Consider ﬁrst the
case of perfect foresight with the high tax rate realized one period later. At t=1, there is a sharp
drop in investment relative to its growth trend. Firms distribute earnings when the tax rate is still
low, knowing for sure that it will be high in the next period. If the higher tax rate is gradually
phased in over time, which is the case for the path marked τdt gradually increased, then the drop
at t=1 is less severe, but investment stays below trend until τdt = τH
d . For the path shown, the
tax rate increases linearly, starting at τL
d in t=1 and rising to τH
d in t=6, and then stays high
thereafter.
Suppose instead of assuming that households have perfect knowledge of the entire future path
of tax rates, I assume there is some uncertainty about future rates. For the two cases marked 50%
15 Intuition for the actual simulation is complicated by the fact that negativity constraints do bind in some states
of the world.
16 In a study of the U.S. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Chetty and Saez (2005) provide
empirical evidence that cuts in dividend taxes have large and immediate eﬀects on payout policies of ﬁrms
with high levels of taxable noninstitutional ownership.
16Probability of High Rate in Figure V, the tax rate is low in t=1, but households now realize that an
increase is possible. The fact that an increase is possible is all that is needed to trigger a drop in
investment, because households and ﬁrms want to take advantage of the current low rate. The fall
in investment occurs regardless of whether the tax rate is increased. In the ﬁrst case, τH
d possible
in t=2, uncertainty is resolved in one period: with 50 percent probability rates stay low and with
50 percent probability rates rise and stay high. Whether the high rate is in fact realized in t=2 is
irrelevant: the pattern is the same because the rate is expected to remain constant thereafter. If
I increase the probability of a tax increase in the next period, say from 50 percent to something
closer to 100 percent, then the equilibrium path is closer to that of the perfect foresight; this is
true even if the higher rate is never realized. Again, what matters is the expected change in the
rate.
Delaying the resolution of uncertainty changes the initial pattern somewhat. In the case
marked τH
d possible in t=3, uncertainty is not fully resolved until t=3. In t=1, there is a 50 percent
chance that the tax rate remains permanently low starting in t ≥ 2 and a 50 percent chance that
the tax rate is low again in t=2 but could increase after that. Investment falls immediately and
continues to fall until the uncertainty is resolved. As before, the path does not depend on the
realization of a high rate occurring in t=3. The expectations of higher rates drive the fall in
investment.
The last simulation shown in Figure V assumes that households have myopic expectations: the
rate next period is expected to be equal to the current rate. Although this scenario is implausible
for the Great Depression, given the many news reports about looming deﬁcits in the early 1930s,
the experiment shows what is needed for no change in investment relative to its trend. What is
not determinate in this case is the path of tax rates: any arbitrary sequence of dividend tax rates
is consistent with the ﬁxed path of investment when expectations are myopic. If households and
ﬁrms expect no change, they do not react by adjusting their investments and distributions.
A second key tax rate in the analysis is the tax on undistributed proﬁts, which was introduced
during the Great Depression in 1936. The ﬁrst-order condition in equation (7) shows that a positive
tax on undistributed proﬁts distorts the intertemporal investment decision. Unlike the tax rate
on distributed proﬁts, the tax rate on undistributed proﬁts has an impact on investment and the
stock of capital even if it is expected to remain constant.
In Figure VI, I display several simulations that highlight the impact of undistributed proﬁts
taxes on investment as I vary expectations. In all cases, I assume that the tax increase is temporary
17as it was in the United States; the rate is temporarily high in the second and third periods. In the
ﬁrst simulation, expectations are perfect and therefore investment rises prior to the tax increase
as ﬁrms anticipate the rate change. Then, once taxes are high, investment drops. Investment
recovers once the tax rate is back to zero, rising slightly above trend and eventually returning to
trend. If ﬁrms are surprised by the increase in taxes and think the rate will be equal to zero in
the next period, then there is no initial increase, but the two-period decline when the tax is in
place is similar to the perfect foresight path. If expectations are myopic, so changes are a surprise
and viewed as permanent, the pattern of investment is the same as in the other two simulations,
although investment does not fall as much in the high tax periods. Investment does not fall more
when expectations are myopic because ﬁrms view the rate increase as permanent.
With this result in mind, it is possible to construct an example in which the investment does
not fall at all and may even rise in high tax periods. Firms may expect future tax rates to be
even higher than they are currently and to remain at that higher level permanently. In this case,
two oﬀsetting eﬀects occur: the higher realized rates impact current investment negatively, but
higher expected future rates impact current investment positively. Whether investment falls or
rises depends on the relative magnitudes of the realized tax rates and the expected future tax
rates.
V.B. Variations in the Benchmark Simulations
Thus far, I have considered the qualitative nature of the results. Next, I consider simulations
starting with the benchmark (shown in Figures I–IV) to investigate the quantitative impact of the
key factors. In all cases, I restrict attention to predictions for investment. (See McGrattan, 2012,
for plots of the other series.)
In Figure VII, I show the consequences of setting the tax rates on dividends and undistributed
proﬁts to zero in the benchmark simulation. If the tax rate on dividends is equal to zero, the model
cannot account for the dramatic decline in investment that occurred between 1929 and 1932. In
this case, the tax rate tomorrow equals the tax rate today and the impact on capital is negligible.
The results in Figure VII are not altered if instead of setting the tax rate on dividends to zero, I
set it equal to any constant. As I showed earlier, what matters is the expectation of next period’s
tax rate relative to today’s.
The fact that the tax rate on dividends has a much larger impact on investment than the
tax rate on proﬁts is best understood by again examining the households’ intertemporal ﬁrst-order
condition in equation (7). Tax rates on proﬁts lower the net return on capital, r − δ − τk. Tax
18rates on dividends, if expected to change, lower the gross return on capital, which is equal to 1+τu
plus the after-tax net return.17 Net returns are on the order of 4 percent, and therefore even large
changes in the tax rate on proﬁts cannot have a large impact on the gross return. On the other
hand, because they impact the gross return, even small changes in the tax rates on dividends can
have a quantitatively large impact, as long as they are not completely unexpected.
The second simulation shown in Figure VII is the case with the undistributed proﬁts tax set to
zero. If the tax rate on undistributed proﬁts is counterfactually set to zero in 1936–1938, then the
model cannot account for the recession of 1937–1938. The tax motivates companies to temporarily
decrease retained earnings and distribute more. For example, the no-tax version of the model
predicts distributions in 1936 and 1937 that are higher by about 33 and 43 percent relative to the
benchmark model predictions, respectively.18
In Figure VIII, I show how the quantitative results for the benchmark simulation depend on
household expectations about ﬁscal policy changes. To do this, I compute the extended model’s
equilibrium for three alternative assumptions about these expectations. One is the benchmark
set of assumptions used in the initial simulation. A second assumes that in 1930, households
put the probability of staying with 1930 policy for another year at 100 percent; the same can
be said for 1931. The transition matrix for 1932 and after is the same as in Table II. I call this
alternative Myopic Expectations, 1930–1931. The third alternative is to assume perfect foresight,
that households have full knowledge of the path of spending and tax rates. I call this alternative
Perfect Foresight, 1930–1939.
As is clear in Figure VIII, the model’s predictions of investment do seem diﬀerent with the
three alternative assumptions. If households place no probabilistic weight on the higher tax rates of
the 1930s, as is true in the case myopic expectations, then investment does not fall initially as much
as it does in the benchmark. If households have perfect foresight, then they react immediately and
sharply to the news by setting business investment close to zero. However, in all cases, there is a
ﬁrst-order eﬀect on investment and one much larger than the basic growth model prediction.
Another diﬀerence worth noting about the experiments shown in Figure VIII is the reaction
17 Consumption taxes also impact the gross returns to capital, but they are not equivalent to dividend taxes
because they aﬀect the households’ intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition as well. It is easy to show the equiv-
alence between the extended model and an alternative without dividend taxes. In the alternative, taxes on
consumption and labor are set as follows: ˆ τct = (1+τct)/(1−τdt)−1 and ˆ τht = 1−(1−τht)/(1−τdt), where
τct, τht, and τdt are tax rates in the original model.
18 Lent (1948) estimates the extent to which the policy impacted distributions by computing deviations of the
correlation between dividend payments and after-tax proﬁts from trend based on data for 1934–1942, excluding
1936 and 1937. From these deviations, he predicts that net dividend payments are higher in both 1936 and
1937 by about 24 percent.
19to news about the undistributed proﬁts tax. In the benchmark simulation, this tax is completely
unanticipated. In the perfect foresight case, it is completely anticipated. Thus, investment sharply
rises between 1931 and 1935 and falls when the tax is in eﬀect.
Clearly, factors other than tax policy were involved in depressing consumption and GDP at
the start of the Depression and hours of work throughout the decade. I next show that adding
exogenous eﬃciency and labor wedges—shocks to productivity and tax rates on labor intended to
generate dynamics of GDP and hours of work equivalent to U.S. patterns—does not worsen the ﬁt
of investment. Speciﬁcally, I allow for variations in Zt and τht that generate a perfect ﬁt between
the equilibrium paths of GDP and hours in the extended model and in the data.19 I then compare
investment in the model and data to see if it looks much diﬀerent from the benchmark simulation
in Figure I.
The exercise shows that the pattern for investment is, if anything, closer to the actual pattern.
This pattern is evident in Figure IX, which plots total investment for the mdoel with and without
exogenous wedges. The inclusion of eﬃciency wedges that act like negative productivity shocks
further depresses investment. However, the impact is not as large as it is for consumption and
output because investment is already close to zero in 1932 and is constrained to be nonnegative
in equilibrium. Thus, the ﬁt of investment is not worsened when the additional factors depressing
the economy are included.
VI. Cross-Country Evidence
My results are broadly supported by evidence on changes in income tax rates and GDP in
other countries during the 1930s.20 Countries had a wide range of experiences during the 1930s.
Some countries had little or no decline in economic activity, and some, like the United States, had
dramatic declines. Although to the best of my knowledge, tax data are insuﬃcient for countries
outside of the United States to conduct the same analysis as above, I do have information about
tax schedules and real per capita GDPs during this period. The information is suggestive that
countries with the largest increases in income tax rates were also the most depressed.
In Table III, I report the top marginal tax rates in 1929 and 1935 for seven countries that had
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent experiences in the 1930s. A preferable measure would be the average marginal
19 As Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) emphasize, the challenge is to ﬁnd primitive shocks and mechanisms
that have the same impact as these time-varying eﬃciency and labor wedges.
20 In McGrattan (2012), I also analyze predictions of the model for other time periods in the United States.
20tax rate on dividends, but the necessary underlying data for this measure—namely, marginal tax
rates and dividend income by income class—are not publicly available for any country but the
United States in this period. Thus, as a proxy for the change in the average marginal tax rate on
dividends, I use the change in the top marginal rate on dividend income, since most dividends are
earned by households in high income classes. Along with tax rates, I report the deviation in per
capita real GDP relative to a growth trend of 1.9 percent per year for the year 1933. Figure X
shows the time series of detrended real GDP for Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, Australia,
New Zealand, the United States, and Canada. Numbers in parentheses are the diﬀerences in the
top marginal tax rates listed in Table III.21
These data show that there is a strong negative correlation, roughly −94 percent, between the
change in the top income tax rates and the deviation in per capita real GDP relative to trend in
1933. As noted above, what matters is the change in the tax rates, not the levels. Thus, the fact
that the United Kingdom had high tax rates in this period is not relevant for the theory. What is
relevant is that their tax policies changed little.
VII. Conclusion
Many theories have been proposed for the large contraction of the 1930s and the slow recovery
thereafter. Absent from the theories of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), Cole and Ohanian (2004), Ohanian (2009), and many others is any role for ﬁscal policy
in this decade. This paper challenges the conventional view that ﬁscal policy played little or no
role in the Great Depression. Government spending and a variety of tax rates rose signiﬁcantly
during this decade, or were expected to, and theory tells us that these events should have had an
impact. Especially important are the sharp rise in tax rates on individual incomes, which include
dividend income, and the introduction of the undistributed proﬁts tax. Large changes in tax rates
on dividends, when fed into the neoclassical growth model, imply a large drop in investments,
similar to what we observed at the start of the 1930s. In the later part of the 1930s, tax rates on
undistributed proﬁts were introduced and led to another dramatic decline in investment.
Although the results show that capital taxation during the U.S. Great Depression had large
eﬀects, it cannot be the only overlooked factor in the analysis of the period. If the only change
21 Sources for the income tax rate schedules are the U.S. Treasury (1916–2010) for the United States, the Com-
monwealth of Australia (1932, 1942–1943) for Australia, Tolley (1938) for the United Kingdom, the Canadian
Tax Foundation (1957) for Canada, Steinmo (1996) for Sweden, Piketty (2001) for France, and Vosslamber
(2010) for New Zealand.
21is a rise in tax rates, theory predicts that consumption counterfactually rises before 1932, with
households anticipating some increases in income taxes and sales taxes. This deviation is also
evident in standard theories of ﬁnancial frictions and remains a challenge for those interested in
accounting for the dramatic contraction in the early 1930s.
Appendix
The main source for the national accounts data used in this study is the U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which publishes the U.S. national accounts
and ﬁxed asset tables in the Survey of Current Business (available online at www.bea.gov), SCB
hereafter. The main source for hours data is Kendrick (1961). In this appendix, I provide details
on these data and the necessary adjustments that are made to make the model accounts consistent
with the U.S. accounts.
A. National Accounts and Fixed Assets
The main components of GDP are found in Table 1.1.5 of the national income and product
accounts (NIPA) from the SCB (1929–2011). GDP in the business sector is set equal to value
added of corporations and nonfarm proprietorships. Nonbusiness output is residually deﬁned as
GDP less business value added.
B. Components of GDP
Components of GDP used as inputs in the quantitative analysis are shown in Table A.1.
Private consumption is deﬁned to be personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and ser-
vices, adjusted to include consumer durable services and to exclude sales tax. (Details of these
adjustments are described below.) Investment is deﬁned to be the sum of gross private domes-
tic investment, government investment, net exports, and personal consumption expenditures on
durables after subtracting sales taxes. Business investment is deﬁned to be the part of investment
made by corporations and nonfarm proprietors. Nonbusiness investment is residually deﬁned as
investment less business investment. Government spending is deﬁned to be government consump-
tion expenditures. In Table A.1, this spending is listed as public consumption to distinguish it from
private consumption. All components of GDP are deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator (in NIPA Table
1.1.9) and population at midperiod (NIPA Table 2.1). The series are then divided by the growth
in labor-augmenting technical change (1 + γ)t.
Components of GDP treated exogenously and used as inputs in the model simulations—
namely, detrended government spending and detrended nonbusiness activities—are ﬁltered using
the algorithm proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997). I set their smoothing parameter (λ) equal
to 1. The unﬁltered series are displayed in Table A.1. The same smoothing procedure is used for
22the tax series displayed in Table I. In a separate technical appendix (McGrattan, 2012), I plot all
of the smoothed inputs along with the original time series.
C. Adjustments to Accounts
Two adjustments are made to GDP and its components to make them consistent with the
model accounts: sales taxes are subtracted, and services for consumer durables and government
capital are added.
Unlike the NIPA, the model output does not include consumption taxes as part of consumption
and as part of value added. I therefore subtract sales and excise taxes from the NIPA data on
taxes on production and imports and from personal consumption expenditures, since these taxes
primarily aﬀect consumption expenditures.
I treat expenditures on all ﬁxed assets as investment. Thus, spending on consumer durables
is treated as an investment rather than as a consumption expenditure and moved from the con-
sumption category to the investment category. The consumer durables services sector is introduced
in the same way as the NIPA introduces owner-occupied housing services. Households rent the
consumer durables to themselves. Speciﬁcally, I add depreciation of consumer durables to con-
sumption of ﬁxed capital of households and to private consumption. I add imputed additional
capital services for consumer durables to capital income and to private consumption. I assume
a rate of return on this capital equal to 4.1 percent, which is an estimate of the return on other
types of capital. A related adjustment is made for government capital. Speciﬁcally, I add imputed
additional capital services for government capital to capital income and to public consumption.
D. Hours Per Capita
The primary source of the hours series in Table A.1 is Kendrick (1961), Table A-X, total
manhours. Nonbusiness hours are the sum of hours in the government and farm sectors. Business
hours are total hours less nonbusiness hours. For per capita hours, I divide the manhours series
by the working-age population, deﬁned to be age 16 and over. The population series is Series A39
of the Historical Statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce (1975).
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26Table I
U.S. Tax Rates, 1929–1939
Individual Income Corporate Proﬁts Indirect Business
Year Labor Dividend Normal Excessa Undistributed Property Sales
1929 3.60 9.51 11.00 −− −− 1.41 2.89
1930 2.40 7.90 12.00 −− −− 1.63 2.99
1931 1.80 7.71 12.00 −− −− 1.60 3.40
1932 3.00 14.13 13.75 −− −− 1.99 3.98
1933 3.20 14.41 13.75 2.00 −− 1.84 5.92
1934 3.60 16.70 13.75 2.00 −− 1.74 6.97
1935 4.10 19.09 13.75 2.00 −− 1.73 7.05
1936 5.50 25.04 15.00 2.00 5.00 1.71 6.90
1937 5.80 24.97 15.00 2.00 5.00 1.69 7.08
1938 4.60 20.23 19.00 2.00 5.00 1.59 7.10
1939 5.10 21.83 19.00 2.00 −− 1.62 7.19
a. in combination with the capital stock tax.
27Table II
Transition Matrix for Benchmark Model Simulation
Policy Next Period’s Policy Like That of
Today





























Changes in Tax Rates and Real GDP in Seven Countries
Top Marginal Income Tax Rates (%) 1933 Per Capita Real GDP
1929 1935 Diﬀerence Relative to Trend
Country (1) (2) (2)−(1) (percent)
Sweden 30.2 35.4 5.2 −10.8
United Kingdom 57.5 63.8 6.3 −11.1
France 41.7 50.4 8.7 −16.5
Australiaa 27.0 42.5 15.5 −14.7
New Zealanda 22.5 39.0 16.5 −19.3
United Statesa 20.0 59.0 39.0 −35.8
Canadaa 40.0 69.3 29.3 −38.3
a. Rates diﬀer by type of income. Table reports rates on dividend income.
29Table A.1
U.S. National Accounts and Hours of Work, 1929–1939
Consumption Aggregate Activity Nonbusiness Activity
Year Private Public GDP Investment Hours Output Investment Hours
1929 68.1 5.8 100.0 26.1 28.9 36.9 15.0 7.4
1930 63.3 6.1 89.0 19.6 26.6 33.2 12.1 7.3
1931 60.4 6.7 81.4 14.3 24.2 33.5 11.0 7.3
1932 54.3 7.1 69.2 7.8 21.2 30.8 7.4 7.0
1933 51.1 7.2 66.4 7.9 21.0 30.4 6.5 7.1
1934 51.6 7.8 70.4 11.0 20.8 29.3 7.3 6.8
1935 52.8 7.7 74.3 13.8 21.6 30.6 9.6 7.0
1936 56.0 8.3 81.8 17.4 23.3 32.5 10.6 7.3
1937 56.0 7.8 83.6 19.8 24.0 32.0 12.3 7.3
1938 54.8 8.3 78.5 15.6 22.1 31.9 12.0 7.1
1939 55.5 8.7 82.5 18.1 22.8 32.3 12.8 7.0
Notes: GDP and components are in real per capita terms and divided by an annual growth trend of 1.019t.
These series are further divided by the 1929 level for per capita real GDP. Hours are in per capita terms and divided


























Detrended Real Investment in the United States and Two Versions


























Detrended Real Consumption in the United States and Two Versions



























Detrended Real GDP in the United States and Two Versions

























Hours Worked Per Capita in the United States and Two Versions
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Figure V
Detrended Real Investment in a Version of the Extended Model,













































Detrended Real Investment in a Version of the Extended Model,
Only Tax Rates on Undistributed Proﬁts and Expectations Are Variable




























Detrended Real Investment in the United States and in the Extended




























Detrended Real Investment in the United States and in the Extended



























Detrended Real Investment in the United States and in the Extended






























Detrended Real GDP for Seven Countries with Diﬀerent Tax Schedules, 1929–1935
Note: The diﬀerences in top marginal rates between 1929 and 1935 are shown in parentheses. The levels of
tax rates are shown in Table III.
40